This paper uses Social Security records to study internal migration in Spain. This is the rst paper that uses this data source, which has some advantages with respect to existing data sources: it includes only job-seeking migrants and it allows to identify temporary migration.
Introduction
How do migration ows respond to local economic conditions? Do workers move a w a y from depressed labor markets relatively high unemployment rates and low w ages, thus reducing the geographical mismatch b e t w een local labor demand and supply? Do skilled workers behave di erently from unskilled workers?
The answer to these questions is important in order to understand the observed migration ows and their e ects on regional labor market imbalances. The issue is even more relevant in view of European integration. Indeed, internal migration is expected to be one Universitat Pompeu Fabra and Universit a Bocconi. Correspondence: Istituto di Economia Politica, Universit a Bocconi, via Gobbi 5, 20136 Milano, Italy. E-mail: carlo.devillanova@uni.bocconi.it; tel.: +02.5836 5342; fax: +02.5836 5318 y Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Department of Economics, C . Ramon Trias Fargas 25-27, 08005 Barcelona, Spain. E-mail: wgarcia@upf.es of the main vehicles for labor market adjustment in the future European Monetary Union EMU. Therefore, it is worth exploring whether workers' ows rightly react to economic incentives, thus reducing local imbalances. Moreover, migration ows are likely to behave di erently in di erent countries, due to geographical characteristics, cultural reasons and alternative institutional regimes.
This paper aims to explore the issue by looking at Spain during the period 1978 -1992.
The equilibrating role of internal migration has been addressed in a number of studies, based both upon micro-data and aggregate migration ows. There exist excellent surveys on internal migration, starting with the in uential work by Greenwood 1975 ; see Greenwood 1993, Greenwood 1997 , Hergoz et al. 1993 . In general, the conclusion is that the response of migration to local labor markets imbalances remains ambiguous.
As concerns Spain, the issue has been investigated by Bentolila and Dolado 1991 and Antol n and Bover 1997, by focusing on interregional migration. Bentolila and Dolado, using aggregate migration ows, nd that both an increase in a region's relative w age and a fall in its relative unemployment rate cause a very little increase of net migration to that region. Antol n and Bover use individual data and get that regional unemployment di erential has a strong, wrong-signed e ect; they argue that this result is mainly due to the anomaly of registered workers at INEM. They also nd that people tend to leave from high real wage regions.
With respect to these works, two main contributions of the paper are worth emphasizing. First, we provide a new data source for studying internal migration in Spain, by using the records of Spanish Social Security. Second, we conduct a more disaggregated analysis by looking at ows between provinces.
We get "wrong" signs in both wage and housing price di erentials: workers move t o locations with higher housing prices and lower wages. Furthermore, we nd that the e ect of employment opportunities changed after 1984. For the period 1978-1984 neither the unemployment rate di erential nor the growth of employment a ect migration ows. However, after 1984 both variables are signi cant and exhibit the expected sign, although the elasticity to the unemployment rate di erential is low. Our analysis also con rms the larger internal mobility of highly quali ed workers.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: the next section describes the data; section 3 presents the framework of analysis and the regression speci cation; the results are presented in section 4. Finally, section 5 concludes. The construction of the data base is explained in appendix 1. Appendix 2 contains all tables and pictures.
The data
Olano 1990 provides a brief description of the main statistical sources for studying internal migration in Spain. They are: general census Censos de la poblaci on de España and Padr on municipal de habitantes, used, among others, by Olano himself and R odenas 1994; data on residential changes National Institute of Statistic, INE, used, for instance, by Bentolila and Dolado 1991; Spanish Labor Force Survey Encuesta de Poblaci on Activa, thereafter EPA, which has been used by A n tol n and Bover 1997; nally, migration can be studied as a residual variable, as in Bentolila and Jimeno 1995 , where the behavior of migration is captured by the di erence between the change in employment, on the one hand, and those of unemployment and participation, on the other 1 . In this paper we provide a new piece of evidence for studying internal workers' mobility in Spain, using the records of Spanish Social Security Cuentas de Cotizaci on de la Seguridad Social, Fichero T ecnico de Cuentas de Cotizaci on.
For each match b e t w een rm and employee the records provide the location of the rm; by c hecking changes through the working history of employees, we can reconstruct their movements.
Special attention should be payed to the meaning of labor mobility in this context. Indeed, workers are registered as migrants only when they nd a job in a new province: at some moment in time we observe a w orker employed in province i; afterwards, the same worker is observed to be employed in province j. In this case we s a y that the worker migrates.
One consequence of this denotation of migration is that we actually do not know when migration occurs. It can be the case that a worker migrates from i to j at the beginning of his her unemployment spell the time lag between job in i and job in j, but we only observe this movement when the new match occurs. This discrepancy can be relevant when unemployment spells are large. As an extreme case, migrants who never nd a job in the province of destination are not observed at all. Workers who get their rst job by migrating to a new province are not counted either.
From this de nition of migration, other more appealing consequences follow. First of all, our measure of mobility includes temporary migration. Generally, administrative data do not record short-run migration people do not need to change residence. In the "Survey on Migration Flows" Encuesta de Flujos Migratorios from EPA, migration is de ned by referring to previous year place of residence. People are asked whether they changed residence in the last year. As a consequence, if a worker gets a temporary job in another province, but returns within the year, this is not recorded as migration in EPA. On the contrary, it is recorded twice in our data, both when the migrant leaves the province and when he she returns. In fact, the study of temporary migration might b e as important as long-run migration. Moreover, Spain experienced a dramatic increase in the proportion of temporary jobs after the 1984 labor market reform 2 .
A second remarkable feature of the data is that they only take i n to account job-seeking migration. People move for many di erent reasons or combinations of reasons quality of life, family links, for studying other than as a reaction to local economic conditions. Of course, one expects factors in uencing migration to di er between people seeking to change employment and residence, if necessary and people moving for other reasons. This problem, known in the literature as multi-stream migration 3 , is often handled by restricting the analysis to a subset of ows, which are expected to be more homogeneous in this respect. In particular, long-distance interregional migration is expected to be mostly determined by job-seeking reasons, while short distance intra-regional migration, by residential choices 4 . H o w ever, this identi cation strategy might rise some problems.
First of all, a large proportion of long-distance migration is not determined by jobseeking reasons. For instance, Bentolila and Dolado 1991 look at migration across Spanish regions long distance migration and nd that 60 of migrants were "nonactive", which means that the majority o f i n terregional migrants were not seeking a job.
Second, during the 1980's the path of regional development in Spain has been much less sharp than before the oil crisis. The impact of the crisis has not been homogenous across regions and, within regions, across provinces. It is conceivable that job-seeking types of migration progressively shifted to short-distance mobility, especially if the cost of migration is related to distance.
Because of the narrow de nition of mobility, our data are almost exempted from the problem of heterogeneity of migration streams.
From these original data we construct a panel of migration ows, by counting the number of migrants -as de ned above -b e t w een provinces every two y ears. We d o n o t use yearly ows both in order to reduce the dimensionality of the data-set and to make the data comparable with disposable provincial gures, which are available in odd numbered years.
Previous studies 5 nd that internal migration in developed countries is mostly migration of high-skilled workers. For this reason, we distinguish migration ows according to workers' quali cation. Workers are grouped into four categories 6 : t ypes from 1 to 3 are in descending order of quali cation; type 4 are pensioners.
For each y ear, and each quali cation, the square matrix of gross ows has 50 rows, corresponding to the Spanish provinces Ceuta and Melilla were excluded from the analysis; the entries in the diagonal, which w e later ignore, are zero by de nition. The data base for our analysis is constructed by crossing this information coming from records from the Spanish Social Security with provincial data provided by F undaci on BBV, as explained in Appendix 1. We use provincial information with a lag, to reduce endogeneity problems with right-hand variables. That is, we cross the 1977 provincial data with 1978 migration ows, 1979 provincial data with 1980 ows, and so on.
Remarks on the speci cation of the dependent v ariable
The dependent v ariable of our analysis is, hence, gross interprovincial migration ows. This choice raises issues of data availability, econometrics tools and computational dimensionality. T h us it is worth justifying our choices.
Interprovincial migration. We look at migration across provinces Spanish "Provincias", while previous works 7 focus on interregional migration Spanish "Comunidades Aut onomas".
A rst reason for a more disaggregated analysis is that we do not want to lose information. As noted by Olano 1990 and R odenas 1994, there has been a relative increase of short-distance migration beginning from the early 1970's. We nd that more than 25 of migration takes place across provinces within the same region.
More importantly, as already noted the path of economic development during the last 20 years is not homogeneous within regions of Spain: some provinces took-o after the second oil crisis 8 . If, as seems plausible, the cost of migration increases with distance, people might optimally choose to move to a province within the same region. In other word, we suspect that the dichotomy short-distance long-distance migration does not really enable to get rid of the multi-streams nature of migration. Again, our narrow de nition of mobility allows us to disregard the problem.
Gross ows. We will argue that gross and net migration ows have a quite di erent behavior. Restricting the analysis to the latter would entail a substantial loss of information.
Bilateral ows. Our dependent v ariable is M q ijt j 6 = i, the number of migrants from each province i to any of the other 49 provinces. Two main reasons justify this choice. First, as pointed out by Huges and McCormick 1994, the decision to emigrate is not independent of the destination choice: "even if you are not interested in destination choice, it is a miss-speci cation to estimate the equation for the probability of migration without taking account of the attractiveness of the alternatives".
Second, by looking at bilateral ows we can express market incentives for migration in terms of the relative attractiveness of the destination with respect to the location of origin. Previous studies 9 regress migration on the di erence between local variables and nationwide levels. A rst shortcoming is that this kind of analysis does not allow one to pick-up pull factors of migration features of the destination areas which attract immigrants.
Still, it is not clear why the local push factors characteristics of the origin areas which generate out-migration should be caught either. The reason is, once again, that moving is costly and the cost of migration is likely to increase with distance. With only two regions this observation is pointless, but with more than one possible destination, the attractiveness of alternatives depends on their relative distance 10 .
A descriptive analysis of migration ows
This subsection is intended to o er a description of the migration ows, which provides guidance for the rest of the work.
Along the whole period, we observe 15,293 migrants over 678,695 total registered workers. This is approximately 2.25 of the sample, a value higher than what one gets by looking at other sources.
The annual emigration rates elaborated by R odenas 1994, using data from INE, reached at most 1.69 in 1989, the last year of the sample. Two reasons could help explain the di erence. First, as already noted, o cial data from INE fail to take i n to account temporary migration; this inevitably underestimates the scale of migration. Second, the migration rate computed by R odenas refers to the whole population; in fact, the active population is more mobile than the non-active population 11 , and this too can explain part of the observed di erence.
The discrepancy is huge when compared with the ndings of Antol n, Bover 1997. The two authors use pooled cross-sections form EPA, for the period 1987-91. From a sample of 224,714 individuals they nd only 664 migrants, which means 0.295. Since Antol n and Bover are concerned with interregional migration, we c hecked whether this di erence is due to higher interprovincial mobility, relative t o i n terregional mobility. H o w ever, the rate of interregional mobility is still 1.68 11,453 migrations across regions. Even when we focus on the last two periods of our sample the period considered by A n tol n and Bover gures change only slightly. Table 1 provides the numbers of interregional and interprovincial migrants by qualications. The resulting picture is a labor market much more integrated for high skilled workers than for the others workers; this is a well known feature of internal migration in developed countries. Pensioners do not show great mobility. Table 1 10 Feder' s aggregation method solves the problem by collapsing the information in all other provinces into a single variable, using distance between i and j d ij a s a w eighting mechanism. Cfr. Feder 1980 , Foot, Milne 1990 and Milne 1991 11 R odenas 1991, pag. 252.
We compute the rate of out-migration by quali cation, EMRATE
, the total number of emigrants from a province i divided by the total number of a liates in that province, and the rate of immigration IMRATE
, the total number of immigrants to a province j, divided by the total number of a liates in that province. Table 2 Workers of quali cation 1 not only display a higher average rate of migration near double with respect to quali cation 3, but also a much higher standard deviation see table 2. Figure 1 plots the rate of out-migration. It is worth noting that migration is highly pro-cyclical for all groups but pensioners. Figure 2 plots the national unemployment rate. Low mobility is associated with high unemployment rates: during recessions ows are reduced; on the other hand, internal migration increases during economic recovery 12 . I t seems that the recession of the early 90's reduced migration ows.
One clear feature of our data is that relatively high gross out ows and in ows generate very small net ows. In our sample, the average rate of net immigration de ned for each province as the total number of immigrants minus the total number of emigrants, divided by the number of a liates is of the order of 0.002 for workers of quali cation 1 and 2 and 0.0007 for workers of quali cation three. In other words, migration goes in both directions: on average, provinces with large out ows also have comparable in ows of workers of the same quali cation. This is what in the literature is known as the Lowry e ect.
In Spain, the Lowry e ect emerged only recently 13 . Bentolila and Dolado 1991, analyzing migration ows in between 1962 and 1986, claim that the unidirectionality o f ows makes gross and net migration behave quite comparably for most of the period. However, they nd a clear pattern only until 1976.
The absence of any strong unidirectionality o f w orkers' ows can also be seen by looking at the cross correlations matrix of the immigration and emigration rates table 3. Indeed, one nds a relatively strong correlation of in ows and out ows of workers of the same category. It runs from 0.43 for quali cation 2 until 0.82 for quali cation 3. The exception is the correlation between immigration and emigration rates for pensioners, which is not statistically signi cant at the 5 level. table 3 A second fact emerges from table 3, ows di er according to workers' quali cation. The correlation of immigration and emigration rates of di erent t ypes of workers are surprisingly low. For instance, the correlation between the immigration rate of workers 12 Same nding in R odenas 1994. The author shows that the decade 1960-70 was characterized by very high mobility; a reduction of mobility took place in the 1970s, especially during the period 1971-75. In between 1986 and 1989 migration was even higher than during the 60's. 13 Olano 1990 was perhaps the rst in recording the new pattern of internal migration in Spain.
of quali cation 1 and quali cation 2 is 0.17. Again, pensioners behave di erently: the correlation of their immigration and emigration rate with migration of other categories of workers is either statistically insigni cant or negative. This observation have also a direct impact on net ows. Net ows are de ned as the total number of immigrants to a province minus total number of emigrants from the same province, distinguished by quali cation
The correlation of net migration ows across quali cations is extremely low see table 4. Table 4 and 5 This feature does not change by considering net migration during the whole period. The correlation between total net ows, obtained by summing net ows over time, for di erent quali cations is very low o r e v en negative see table 5 .
Two main facts emerge from this descriptive section. First, interprovincial migration exhibits a strong Lowry e ect and net ows are much l o w er than gross ows. Second, workers' quali cations a ect their mobility decisions; we will further explore the issue later in the paper.
As an example, let's look at two big cities, Barcelona and Madrid. Table 6 and 7 Both Barcelona and Madrid have negative net ows see table 6 . However, if we l o o k a t the balance for the 4 di erent groups, they behave quite di erently. Barcelona gained 29 workers of quali cation 1, while the net-ows are negative for the other three groups. On the other hand, Madrid lost 118 workers of quali cation 1 and 2, and this is o set by a net arrival of 110 workers of low quali cation 3. Table 7 gives the avor of the Lowry e ect -gross ows which goes both ways -for Madrid only, but this also occurs for almost all Spanish provinces.
Framework of Analysis
Internal migration can be described by means of a square matrix, whose rows and columns are locations within a country. The element ij represents the number of migrants from location i to location j, M ij in this section the indexes for year and quali cation were suppressed in order to simplify the notation. Some regularities have been observed within this framework. Namely, the matrix has larger values for migration between large places and or in correspondence of locations which are geographically closer.
The baseline gravity model tries to capture these regularities by modelling M ij as directly proportional to the population size of areas P i and P j and inversely proportional to the distance d ij . Assuming multiplicative errors and taking logarithms one gets ln M ij = 0 + 1 ln P i + 2 ln P j + 3 ln d ij + " ij where the 's are coe cients. Treating ln M ij as a continuous variable and assuming errors to be log-normally distributed, the model can be estimated by means of standard econometric tools 14 .
However, a trivial feature of the migration matrix is that the larger the number of locations considered, the greater the proportion of zero and of very small values. A small positive constant should be added to zero ows so that logarithms are de ned, but then parameter estimates strongly depend on the choice of the constant. ij is the mean of the distribution and can be related to a set of regressors X ij , still to be speci ed ln ij = X ij where is the vector of parameters.
One implicit assumption of the Poisson model is that the variance of M ij equals its mean ij . In fact, migration ows often show a greater variability than expected under the Poisson model. This situation is denoted in the literature as overdispersion, or extraPoisson variation.
Many reasons can explain overdispersion in the data 15 . I t m a y be caused because the model does not include all the relevant explanatory variables, or because the covariates, which are typically represented by a v erages of wages, housing prices, unemployment of the areas, might not succeed in capturing the variance of individuals' opportunities. Finally, the Poisson model assumes that migration events are independent o v er time, over space absence of clustering and between individual movers. Violation of any of these assumption leads to a violation of the Poisson variance assumption. This last problem becomes even more serious when the Poisson regression pools bilateral ows over time periods 16 , as in our study. 14 The model has been extended in order to include other variables a ecting migration; see Molho 1984 . 15 For an exhaustive review of the topic, see Congdon 1993 and Winkelmann and Zimmermann 1995. 16 Cfr. Congdon 1993. In the presence of extra-Poisson variation, the assumption that data are Poisson a ects the estimates and results in wrong overstated signi cance levels of the independent variables.
In fact, we c hecked whether our migration ows are Poisson distributed, and the comparison of the chi-squared goodness-of-t statistic with disposable degrees of freedom indicates the presence of strong overdispersion in the sample.
A where u is the individual's utility function, y i is income, c is the cost of migration and the prime refers to next period value function. Migration is optimal as long as the di erence between the expected value function of being in location j and that of staying at home is greater then the loss in utility due to migration cost:
The empirical strategy is to assume that the comparison between the value function of leaving and the value function of staying is done in terms of observable characteristics of locations X j and X i . Assuming that the utility function is linear, then migration is optimal if its cost is less or equal to the expected gains: c f j X j , f i X i . The probability of migrating is going to be a function of observable characteristics of locations X i and X j , and the cost of migration.
With a more general concave utility function, the cost of migration would be inversely related to income y i : the lower income is, the more valuable the loss of resources due to migration. In this case migration takes place when u y i , u y i , c f j X j , f i X i .
The human capital model of migration provides testable conditions under which i t i s optimal to migrate. However, as already stressed, we only observe migration when the migrant nds a new job in the province of destination. In other words, when the cost of migration is less or equal to the expected gains, an individual optimally decides to look for a job in the other location.
Following Jackman and Savouri 1992, here migration can be viewed as the consequence of a successful job search for re-employment, rather than as a pre-condition for it. Vanderkamp 1977 shows that an aggregate migration function of the gravity t ype emerges from a search model in which migration is seen as a response to information about vacancies in other locations.
Regression speci cation
Finally, w e run a Generalized Negative Binomial regression, which performs a maximum likelihood estimation of 1,2,3, where the logarithm of the overdispersion parameter is allowed to vary across observations as a linear combination of a set of covariates z ij ln = z ij
The sample is split into two sub-samples, each of four periods. The rst sub-sample pools together 4 cross-sections, from 1978 to 1984; the second, the remaining 4 cross-sections, from 1986 to 1992. The likelihood ratio test for equal distribution of the two periods allows us to reject the hypothesis of identical distributions at any level of signi cance. The dependent v ariable is M q ijt ; the number of workers of quali cation q moving at time t from province i to province j.
All regressors are in logarithms, thus allowing for a direct interpretation of the results in terms of elasticities.
Let's begin with the regressors for the mean of the distribution X ijt . We include the distance between provinces, d ij .
The size of origin and destination is measured by the total number of registered workers in the provinces T O T q it and T O T q jt . Population size can itself in uence migration if people care about the dimension of the province for instance, big cities could be preferred because of the easier access to services. Moreover, the total number of vacancies arising in a province j is proportional to j's population size, because of the natural turnover of its labor force 17 . Since we do not have data on vacancies by provinces, they are proxied by population size.
The variables describing economic conditions at origin relative to destination are the ratio origin destination in: housing rental prices, weight of the agricultural sector, weight of the services sector, wage rate, unemployment rate and percentage change of employment. By taking the logarithms of the ratios, we are constraining the e ect of economic variables to be the same at the origin and destination. This speci cation allows for an immediate interpretation in terms of the equilibrating role of migration.
We also include income per-capita in the province of origin. Per-capita income of destination was never found to be statistically signi cant and is excluded from the nal speci cation.
The ratio of housing rental prices proxies for the cost of living. The next two v ariables are intended to control for the sectorial composition of the economy. W e expect higher employment growth and higher wages in the province of origin to lower out-migration. On the contrary, a higher unemployment rate should increase out-migration.
A dummy v ariable for each y ear was included but not reported in the tables of results, in order to control for the heterogeneity caused by pooling together di erent periods. They are found to be statistically signi cant.
Since variables a ecting the general attractiveness of each location may h a v e been omitted 18 , w e follow the common practice 19 of including one dummy v ariable for each province of origin not reported in the results, which are found to be statistically signi cant 20 .
We run separate regressions for workers quali cation 1, 2 and 3 and pensioners. In the regression for workers, dummy v ariables are included for di erent quali cations. We c heck whether the slopes and not only the levels di er across types of workers. The response to economic variables was found to be similar across categories, except for wages, therefore, in the nal speci cation we leave only the interaction variables with wages.
The covariates z ij of the logarithm of the overdispersion parameter are: a constant, the distance, and the population size of origin and destination. We also include dummy variables for quali cation 1 and 2, in order to allow for di erent unexplained variability across categories.
Results
The regression results are reported in tables 8 and 9 of appendix 2. Let's summarize the main nding of our analysis.
A rst remark applies to all four regressions two pooled regressions, for workers and pensioners: the likelihood ratio tests against the hypothesis that data are Poisson distributed clearly rejects that is equal to zero. This means that data have signi cant extra-Poisson variation and the Negative Binomial model is the appropriate one.
All the explanatory variables of the overdispersion parameter are signi cant 21 . I n particular, the unexplained variability increases with distance and decreases with the population size of origin and destination: everything else constant, migration ows are more erratic between small and distant provinces.
The dummies for quali cations are signi cant in explaining the logarithm of . The extra-Poisson variation is lower the more quali ed workers are.
Focusing on the second period 1986-1992 the overall impression is that job opportunities are an important determinant of migration. Workers move a w a y from relatively agricultural provinces to locations with more developed services sectors. A higher unemployment rate, as well as a lower employment growth, prompt people to change province. Note, however, that the elasticity of migration with respect to the unemployment rate, although signi cant is quite low. Seeking a new job, migrants accept to move to provinces with lower average wage rates and higher housing prices.
The e ect of unemployment rate di erentials on migration is controversial. Antol n and Bover 1997, analyzing the Spanish labor force survey EPA, observe a perverse e ect of unemployment on migration and argue that this is mainly due to the anomaly of registered workers at INEM. In general, the role of the unemployment rates has been found to be extremely sensitive to the model speci cation 22 . T h us, our ndings need some further quali cations.
First of all, our data set does not say a n ything about migrants which do not nd a new job. A worker who migrates but remains unemployed is not recorded in our sample. Thus our ndings are still compatible with those in Antol n and Bover 1997, as long "wrong" migration to locations with higher unemployment rates does not result in reemployment.
Second, the results are correct coeteris paribus. In particular, dummy v ariables for the provinces of origin are found to be statistically signi cant and to improve the explanatory power of the model.
With respect to wages and housing prices, our analysis may su er from the low quality of disposable provincial data. The e ect of wages is the same that Antol n and Bover 1997 found. One possible explanation of this result is that, in fact, in Spain wages are 21 Except for the regression for pensioners period 1978-1984. 22 See Hergoz et al. 1993 .
not very responsive to local economic conditions, especially for manual workers 23 . This hypothesis merits further empirical investigation. It is conceivable that the institutional characteristics of the local labor market not only a ect whether productivity di erentials show-up in wages di erentials or unemployment rate di erentials, but also the way w orkers react to those imbalances 24 .
Our analysis warns us of the importance of imperfections in housing markets in discouraging labor reallocation. People who nd a job in a new province, on average have to a ord higher housing expenditures.
Distance and population size have the expected e ect on workers' mobility. Namely, we nd that moves are larger between neighboring provinces, and that more populated places attract new workers.
Higher quali ed workers are more mobile. The dummy v ariables for quali cation 2 and 3 are signi cant and negative. This is a very well known feature of internal migration within developed countries. Devillanova 1988 argues that the low mobility of less skilled workers may h a v e perverse e ects on the stabilization role of migration.
Some remarkable di erences characterize the rst pooled regression 1978-1984 with respect to the second one 1986-1992. First, until 1984 the unemployment rate and the change of employment are not statistically signi cant. Still, sectorial composition a ects migration, but the elasticities are lower than in the second period. Second, the constant in the second sub-sample 1986-1992 is double that in the rst sub-sample. Finally, the ratio of local wage rates is not signi cant for workers of quali cation 1.
Thus, the equilibrating role of migration is much l o w er or even absent during the period 1978-1984. The interpretation of this result is not obvious. It may be due to the change of the business-cycle conditions in 1984 the national unemployment rate reached its maximum value of 21.3. A second possible explanation relies on the temporary contracts labor market reform, in 1984. The reform might h a v e increased internal mobility in Spain.
A nal remark can be made on the role of return migration. The conventional wisdom is that migrations from the north of Spain to the poorer Southern regions can be explained by return migration of retired workers. Already Antol n and Bover 1997 nd that those perverse migration ows are not particularly a ected by people near retirement age. Our analysis con rms that pensioners are a relatively small sub-sample of migrants. Moreover, they do not move to provinces with a higher unemployment rate and or a greater agricultural sector.
Conclusions
This paper tries to answer the above questions by using information from the records of Spanish Social Security. W e estimate an extended gravity model by performing a Generalized Negative Binomial regression on gross migration ows between Spanish provinces. Four biannual cross-sections are pooled together, from 1978 to 1984 and from 1986 to 1992.
For the period 1986-1992 we nd that job opportunities are an important determinant of migration. Workers move a w a y from relatively agricultural provinces to locations with more developed services sectors. A higher unemployment rate, as well as a lower growth of employment, prompt people to change province. Seeking a new job, migrants accept to move to provinces with lower average wage rates and higher housing prices.
On the other hand, before 1986 unemployment rates and employment growth di erentials do not play an important role in driving migration ows. Temporary contract reform in 1984 might h a v e had a positive e ect in increasing internal mobility in Spain.
We also nd that the market of highly quali ed workers is more geographically integrated. However, the response of workers to economic incentive is similar across qualications.
A direct comparison of these results with the existing literature on internal migration in Spain is not intuitive, both because of the peculiarity of the information contained in the Social Security records and because we c hoose to look at migration between provinces, while previous studies analyze regional migration out-ows. Future research should repeat a similar exercise for aggregate regional migration ows.
A further line of research, which w e are pursuing at the moment, is to look directly at the individual data.
Appendix 1: The Data
The data base for this analysis was constructed by crossing information coming from the Spanish Social Security, provincial data from Fundaci on BBV and distance data computed from maps provided by SAS Institute.
Social Security Data
The original data is a random sample of Social Security Records -Fichero T ecnico de A liados, Instituto Nacional de la Seguridad Social provided by Centro de Estudios Avanzados en Econom a, Universidad Carlos III, see Cardel us-Farr e 1993. It has information about 700,000 workers and contains the work history of a liated workers till July 1993, when the information was downloaded. The total number of records is 4,156,003, and includes information about periods of employment, periods of illness and out-of-employment when INEM Instituto Nacional de Empleo i s p a ying to the Social Security and information about pensioners. The data provided includes information about age of the workers, Spanish province where the worker is a liate to the Social Security, professional category of the contribution of the worker to the Social Security, dates when the employment spell starts and ends and type of Social Security system for the worker R egimen General, R egimen Agrario, etc..
We follow a cleaning strategy similar to Garc a-Fontes and Hopenhayn 1995a and 1995b and Garc a-Perez 1997. After eliminating incomplete records and keeping only workers a liated to the General System R egimen General, w e eliminate special systems like Agriculture, Fisheries, and so on; almost all workers, independently of the economic sector where they work, are a liated to the R egimen General, we k eep only spells after 1978. From the remaining records we extract a random sample of 682375 records, corresponding to 140100 workers. Based on these records, and by c hecking changes in location within the working history of each w orker, we construct matrices of migration ows by y ear and quali cation as follows. For year t t = 7 8 ; 80; :::; 92 we compute the total number of a liates for each quali cation in our sample and the total number of corresponding migration events. The ratio between migration events and total a liates is our migration rate. We de ne four quali cation groups, based on the Social Security tari of workers, according to the following YEAR, PROVOLD, PROVNEW and QOLD indexes each observation.
Provincial Data
We use the panel constructed by F undaci on BBV. This series comes biannually odd years. The variables used in our analysis are the following:
RATAGRI: Ratio between agricultural sector weight i n p r o vince of origin to agricultural weight i n province of destination. Agricultural weight is computed by the ratio of agricultural income to provincial GNP.
RATSER: Ratio between services sector weight in province of origin to services sector weight in province of destination. Services weight is computed by the ratio of agricultural income to provincial GNP.
RENORI: Per capita income of province of origin. RATEMP: Ratio between employment growth between province of origin and province of destination. RATWAG: Ratio between wage rate in province of origin to province of destination. Wage rate is computed as total income from workers over number of employed at the provincial level.
RATUNR: Ratio between unemployment rate of province of origin to province of destination. RATPRV: Ratio between housing prices in province of origin to province of destination. Housing prices is proxied by renting and real estate income over provincial GNP.
The following two tables provide a description of these data:
Provincial Data: Summary Statistics As commented in the text, we use this provincial information with a lag, to reduce endogeneity problems with right-hand variables. So the years corresponding to this variables are 1977, 1979, 1981, 1983, 1985, 1987, 1989 and 1991. 
Distance data
The distance between provinces, DISVEC, is computed using coordinates from data maps from SAS Institute from approximated centers of the province. This variable varies obviously only with PROVNEW and PROVOLD.
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